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BOOK REVIEWS
Gateway to Citizenship. By Carl B. Hyatt. Washington: United
States Government Printing Office. 1943. Pp. vii, 153.
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter once said, " ...
they [immigrants]
come not merely because persecution drives them; they come because
the American tradition beckons them." Once we allow those persons
of other lands to take up their residence within our shores and become
American citizens, the question arises as to how we are going to impress upon them the meaning of the American way of life.
All immigrants desiring to become citizens must maintain their
residence within the United States for a certain number of years. They
must meet certain educational requirements, and comply with the various regulations as set up by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Yet something is lacking in this whole process in that it tends
to become too cut and dried a procedure, culminating in naturalization
ceremonies which fail to dignify and emphasize the importance of
citizenship. In aiding in the naturalization of some fifteen hundred
soldiers the importance of these ceremonies has made a lasting impression upon the writer of this review. On days when we rushed a group
of soldiers to the door of the courtroom, scurried in when the judge
called a short recess in his regular business for the purpose, heard the
names of each of the men read hurriedly from a long list, saw the
judge sign the court or&r without so much as glancing up from his
bench, and scurried out again so the usual "run of the mill" cases
could go on, there seemed to be an empty feeling on the part of the
naturalized persons. Many men have asked, "Is that all?" in tones
which registered complete -disappointment.
There has been a crying need for literature to aid those engaged
in work pertaining to naturalization to make the induction ceremony
one which will remain in the memories of naturalized citizens for the
rest of their lives. That need has been fulfilled by the Department of
Justice in its excellent book entitled Gateway to Citizenship by Carl B.
Hyatt, Specialist in Education, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, in cooperation with the Committees on
American Citizenship of the American Bar Association and the Federal Bar Association. It is a manual of principles and procedures for
use by members of the bench and bar, the staff of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, civil and educational authorities, and patriotic organizations in their jefforts to dignify and emphasize the significance of citizenship. Prepared by persons and organizations who
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are experts in the field, it contains a wealth of information, suggestions,
and ideas which can be used in making the induction ceremony a real
medium for implanting and preserving the spirit of America in the
minds and hearts of new Americans.
Beginning with a historical background, the manual sets forth the
significance of the naturalization ceremony in interesting, clear, and
concise language. No exact formula is laid -down to be minutely followed; instead, suggestions are made which will fit any situation that
may arise.
As the author states, the time and place of induction is not as important as the induction itself; but he gives many suggestions as to
how the careful selection of a suitable background may enhance the
ceremony. He is careful to state that every final hearing must, by
law, be had "in open court."' As for the time, it is recommended that
Saturday and evening sessions be held in order to bring some relief
from the pressure on the court and to eliminate court work that has
no bearing on naturalization proceedings. Too, such sessions offer a
greater opportunity for friends, relatives, bar associates, civil and educational authorities and members of patriotic organizations to be present, either for personal reasons or for the purposes of cooperating with
the judge in carrying out the spirit of the joint resolution.
All preliminary procedures and activities not absolutely essential to
induction purposes should be completed beforehand so that nothing
will interfere with the smooth functioning of the court at the time of
induction. The need for solemnity and impressiveness in the opening
of the court if handled well will influence, in a large measure, the
solemnity of the courtroom audience and its attentiveness to the proceedings. The flag, appropriate music, and an invocation may be used
in various ways to make the ceremony more impressive. At no stage
in the induction ceremony are there more local variations than at the
presentation, or examination, of candidates for the decree of naturalization. Yet deep emotional responses can be aroused at the conclusion
by an oath clearly and judiciously given, and sincerely and thoughtfully
repeated. Therefore the procedure of oath taking should be divorced
from the routine and made more impressive by having it rendered by
a person who can do it clearly and coherently so that it may be easily
understood.
The subject of the address to new citizens is excellently handled.
Details should be properly left to the judge of the court. Judges are
reminded that the address centers around the theme of the implications of citizenship, emphasizing alike the duties and privileges, the
'Sec. 334(a) Nationality Act of 1940; 8 U. S. C. A. §734(a) (1942). 54 Stat.
1156 (1940).
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obligations and rights of our American democracy. It should be short,
inspirational, and expressed in simple English to be effective. As subject material the author advocates the pointing out of contributions to
the American way of life by famous foreign-born Americans so as to
give the newly naturalized citizens a feeling of belonging to America
and to instill in them a willingness to do their part for their adopted
country.
The awarding of the Certificate of Citizenship by the judge at the
time of the regular ceremony carries greater significance than the presentation of them by the clerk at a later date. In addition to the certificate, some little memento, or souvenir of the occasion, might become
a concrete symbol of the emotions of the new citizen experienced at
2
the time of the assumption of citizenship.
The pledge of allegiance will have the greatest effect if it comes
immediately after the oath and if both the old and the new citizens
participate. The entire group then experiences a common feeling in
the pledge of allegiance to democratic ideals.
Courts should not close in the usual manner but should use a procedure which produces an inspirational and appropriate atmosphere
which will not be easily forgotten. The climax should be solemn in
order to enhance the atmosphere of the program.
In an effort to further community participation in the naturalization process, Congress passed a joint resolution in 1940 which reads
in part as follows:
"Either at the time of the rendition of the decree of naturalization,
or at such other time as the judge may fix, the judge or someone
designated by him shall address the newly naturalized citizens upon the
form and genius of our government and the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship; it being the intent and purpose of this section to
enlist the aid of the judiciary, in cooperation with civil and education
authorities, and patriotic organizations in a continuous effort to dignify
and emphasize the significance of citizenship."8
Many courts construe the resolution to include any, or all, organizations which have an interest, directly or indirectly, in the naturalization of non-citizens, as possible participants in the "effort to dignify
and emphasize the significance of citizenship."
Well-planned citizenship programs, in which there is an active participation by representatives of the community, not only during the
court cerempny but also before and after, can go far toward blending
This writer's experience has been that such a memento is treasured as much,
or more, than the certificate itself. Practically all soldiers whom I have seen
naturalized cherished the newspaper account and pictures of their naturalization
more than anything else.

S54 Stat. 178 (1940), 8 U. S. C. A. §727a (1942).
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the new citizen into the community and making him a part of America.
The designation by the President of "I am An American Day" has
afforded opportunity for the staging of such programs. This idea had
its inception shortly after the passage by Congress of the joint resolution, when the President of the United States issued a proclamation
putting the resolution into effect.
In addition to the splendid handling of the subject of the naturalization ceremony the manual contains a valuable section devoted to
source material which may be used to advantage in the naturalization
process. This section includes statements by Presidents and Chief Justices of the United States, statements by foreign-born Americans, suggestions for addresses to new citizens, prayers, pledges, and oaths of
allegiance. The index, compiled by Arthur Robb, Legal Research
Attorney, United States Department of Justice, is commendable for
its completeness.
The manual should be included on the bookshelves of every office
which comes into contact, even remotely, with the subject of naturalization. The Gateway to Citizenship admirably fulfills its purpose: to
assist members of the Bench and Bar, the staff of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and other interested workers to dignify and
emphasize the importance of citizenship. From this series of suggestions, ideas, and materials gathered from a survey of practices everywhere, there should result an increase in emphasis on the importance
of becoming a citizen and the dignification of the process so important
to our country in war and peace.
JAMES V. MORGAN.

High Point, North Carolina.
Member of the North Carolina Bar.
Now on duty with the Army Air
Forces in North Africa.
Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes. By William Everett Britton. St. Paul: The West Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. xx,
1245. $5.00.
Professor Britton has added an excellent treatise on Bills and Notes
to the Hornbook Series which now includes thirty-seven volumes. The
book gives ample evidence of the author's thorough knowledge of the
statutory and case law on the subject. A criticism may be made of
many other books on Negotiable Instruments that their authors have
not fully grasped the importance of the universal adoption in the United
States of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. It has been approximately twenty years since the last state adopted it and it has been in
effect in some states for nearly half a century. The previous Horn-
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book on the subject (Norton, 4th Ed.), was especially vulnerable to the
criticism that it attached so little importance to the statute.
The present Hornbook is unequivocal in its recognition of the fact
that the statute has superseded the case law as to those questions which
are covered by statute. This is illustrated by the quotation from an
opinion by the Kansas Supreme Court. "The only reason which need
be given for the conclusion reached is that the statute so provides. It
is sufficient that the law is so written. 'Ita lex scripta est.' "I
From this it should not be concluded that the book is a mere recital
of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with accompanying interpretations. It does not follow the outline of the statute and
is far more useful than it would be as an annotated edition of the
statute. The introduction contains an interesting discussion of the
function and early history of negotiable instruments, codification of
the-law, the types of instruments and leading principles of the law. In
the introduction 2 it is pointed out that the courts have been guilty of
the same sin of omission in overlooking the statute as has been charged
against the text writers above.
The black-letter headings which distinguish a Hornbook have been
prepared with the greatest of care. They frequently use language
which differs from the exact wording of the statutory provisions but
always represents an improvement. A state legislature which desires
to give its negotiable instruments law a thorough overhauling would be
well advised to select its sections from the black-letter headings of this
book.
There is a commendable frankness in stating in connection with
many problems that there is an irreconcilable split of authorities. In
most cases the author states the two views and allows the reader to
take his choice. Occasionally he shows a definite preference for one
position, for example, as that a payee may be a holder in due course,
and refutes the arguments made for the negative position.
Moreover the book is forthright in its criticism of the holdings in
some cases which have been based upon a misconception of the statute.
Werner Piano Co. v. Henderson and Reese, 121 Ark. 165, 180 S. W.
495 (1915), and Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326,
175 N. W. 93 (1920), are described as cases in which the decisions
were unwise and unnecessary.
As a general proposition, the author makes it quite clear when he
is reporting the law as expounded in the cases and when he is giving
expression to his own views which may not have judicial support. One
exception which happened to catch the attention of the reviewer is
found on page 390. The statement is made that "a claimant of the
3 P. 41.

2

P. 20.
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holder in due course position must himself satisfy all of the requisites
of due course holding." This is followed by a statement that a good
faith holder who gave no value himself could not rely on a previous
holder's giving of value to qualify him as a holder in due course. The
only authority cited is a law review article in which, however, the
position was taken that the language of Section 26 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law dearly makes it possible to do just that. The problem is far more important than its treatment in the Hornbook and
other texts would indicate. The question as to whether a bank becomes
a holder for value when it credits its depositor's account with the
amount of certain instrument is discussed at length. If the court should
have its attention called to the fact that the depositor himself gave
value (if such was the fact) even though he was not a holder in due
course, it might well find under Section 26 that the bank having the
other qualifications of a holder in due course is deemed a holder for
value even before it has permitted withdrawals from the account.
The discussion of bank credit as value should have a reference to
the note in (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 628 which makes a definite contribution to the understanding of the problem. It is a questionable criticism" of a book which probably contains more law review citations than
any text in its field, that it does not contain more. The absence of a
table of law review citations is one of the noticeable defects of the
book. It is probable that the failure to include this and other useful
features such as the Bills of Exchange Act and related American statutes is attributable to the desire to conserve pages.
One other criticism concerns the failure to give credit in at least
two instances to the excellent text of the late Professor Lile, BIGELOW
ON BILLS, NoTEs AND CHECKS (3rd ed. 1912). The latter book, at
least until the appearance of this Hornbook, was the most scholarly
text in this field. The Hornbook in discussing the right of a drawer
to recover money paid out on a materially altered instrument,3 and also
the right of an obliger to set up the jus tertii,4 fails to make any reference to the treatment of these subjects in long footnotes in Professor
Lile's book. In the former instance credit is given to a law review
article which itself recognized the valuable discussion by Professor
Lile. In the latter instance, while his argument is used, he is not
mentioned.
For fear that mentioning certain defects may give a wrong impression, it is repeated that in this reviewer's judgment, this Hornbook is
ROBERT M. HUNTER.
the best text on Negotiable Instruments.
Professor of Law,
Ohio State University.
' P. 650 et seq.

'P. 751 et seq.
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American Political Parties: Their Natural History. By Wilfred E.
Binkley. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1943. Pp. xi, 407, xii.
$3.75.
"Political parties are devices for doing indirectly in democratic
societies what is done directly in non-democratic societies. That is to
say, they control the approaches to public power and are the instrumentalities by which powerful groups ...achieve control of government and maintain themselves in power." 1
It is important, if this be their nature, to know something of the
role played in the past by political parties; for their power continues
at a never-diminishing rate. Since they are always with us, it aids in
understanding their present-and potential-influence to look back and
examine their origin and subsequent history. But it is only necessary
to glance at history itself; for so entwined have parties been with our
past that they not only are visible in its every aspect; they have frequently determined the course of this same history. One would have
developed quite differently without the other to mould it, if indeed,
either would have developed at all.
The account is not a simple, strictly chronological one. It is made
more graphic by grouping developments and ideas into broad periods
and showing the role that parties have played in terms of what has
been accomplished by the people who supplied the leadership which
enabled the group to make its influence felt. The author has absorbed
his material and released it objectively; it has benefited as a result of
his ability. The presentation remains throughout a natural history. He
has written interestingly and with animation, and apparently his account
is authoritative and his views are sound. He speaks assuredly, but not
obnoxiously, and his approach and presentation should insure a large
reading public. The analyses of personalities, as well as of events, are
clearly, shrewdly, and deeply drawn. Detail, humor, critical evaluation,
and historical background are well-proportioned. All who are interested
in government, as all should be, will find value and interest in its pages.
This interpretation of the development of parties is told in terms
of social and economic history, and aggregate opinion; a vor populi has
furnished the impetus for beginning all major political struggles, and,
this has been based on changes and developments in the ways of American living. The voting public, since it was interested in its aims to
the extent of doing battle to bring them about, has sought out its
leaders, given them its confidence, and supported them in action. Of
course the statesmen, the politicians, the leaders who directed these
events are no less important than the very existence of the party itself,
' Odegard, PoliticalParties and Group Pressures, 179 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

68.
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since they guided its growth, led the struggles, kneaded the constituents,
and synthesized those ideas and purposes with the political group which
was able to produce results. Without these specific personalities, it is
safe to assume that events would have developed quite differently, even
if it may be precarious to try to see if they would have been better or
worse. But here, as is often the case, while the human element shaped
the course of history, this self-same leadership was in turn affected and
modeled by the events which it sought to control. There remains the
old question: Do men shape events or events shape men?
Parties have behaved peculiarly during their history of the past one
hundred and fifty years. They have experienced birth, illness, and
death. There have been marriages, brief separations, and outright
divorces. Scandals have not been absent. There have been children,
both legitimate and questionable, as well as bastards, hybrids, and
orphans, step-children and foster children. They have run the gamut
of human emotion, from success, worship, and sacrifice to frustration,
treachery, and failure. But since a political party is only the reflection
of existing conditions, expressed in terms of human endeavor and
frailty, this is really not surprising. It can only be the sum of its component parts.
Political parties, at least in the light of the definition given above,
did not begin only with the formation of the government in 1789.
There were no formal recognized organizations before then, or even
immediately after the infant democratic experiment was set up; yet
groups wielding influence were definitely in evidence as early as 1676,
as witnessed in Bacon's rebellion. Social forces were in direct conflict
here, but though the differences were sectional, they were localized.
Not until British oppression forged a semblance of unity among the
bickering colonies could there be any national alignment.
So it was mainly after 1787 that the divergent groups, brought together by common interests, and led by Washington and Hamilton,
formed the first national party. In a sense, however, the Federalists
were to commit suicide, because the members did not look on themselves
as a political organization, not believing in such an institution. John
Adams expressed his fear that the Republic would be divided into two
great parties, declaring that it would be the greatest political evil possible under the Constitution. John Marshall avowed that nothing "pollutes the human mind more than a political party." Washington
likewise condemned the idea in his "Farewell Address." With these
views, they naturally never created any adequate machinery to perpetuate the party, so that it failed to become a powerful weapon for
concerted action.
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The Anti-Federalists had their colonial forbears in the backcountry
regions from Maine to Georgia, the Scotch-Irish wherever they were,
the small farmers, the hunters and trappers of the South, the Green
Mountain Boys of Vermont, and the thrifty German farmers of Pennsylvania. Each opposed its individual counterpart, but all represented
opposition to the autocratic, proprietary interests, whether it be church,
planter aristocracy, or wealthy merchant. Thomas Paine unconsciously
touched the spark, Patrick Henry kindled the flame, while Jefferson
was to carry the torch. Though they struggled separately in the several
states to prevent ratification of the Constitution, the Anti-Federalists
were still not a national party because they had no nation-wide combination, in spite of the Jefferson-Hamilton controversies, and the
agrarian-business differences. It remained for the genius of Jefferson
to later create the first genuinely American party.
As the Jeffersonian Republicans' stock began to rise, the Federalist
opposition gradually sank towards ruin; yet still the general opinion
remained that political parties as such were evil. Following the War
of 1812, there occurred a one-party government. Jackson rode this
crest into office, pushed by parts of all sections of the country-Southern yeomen and farmers, Northwest pioneers, Northern immigrants,
and Eastern country folk.
Jacksonian democracy reigned for almost two decades, when discontent appeared in transient organizations which carried little strength.
The Workingmen's Party, the Equal Rights Party, the Locofocos, the
Barnburners, the Hunkers, the Liberty Party, the Know-Nothings-all
were relatively shortlived objections which actually accomplished little,
though they served to express opposition to those in power.
It remained for the Whigs, with the traditions of Hamilton and the
moneyed interests, to purge the government of Jackson's extreme practices and tyranny. Clay was their strong leader, and their avowed
purpose became to preserve the Union; Harrison and Taylor personified it in office. In the Harrison campaign, the labor vote was captured with the slogan, "Harrison, two dollars a day, and roast beef,"
which smacks of the later-day "two cars in every garage and a chicken
in every pot" idea. In the century and a half from one of the greatest
presidents to one of the most greatly discussed, there has been surprisingly little basic difference in the political techniques and methods
through which a party has transformed the aims of its members into
action.
Even as late as this the nation insisted that there could be but one
political party, and each considered itself a fraction of the Republican
Party. The two-party system did not become recognized as such until
the forties, and each "faction" then became proficiently organized so
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that a powerful oppostion was able to really assume the power; however the issue of slavery proved strong enough to break up both the
major parties. Lincoln and Douglas, the proponents of opposite extremes, appeared with a meteoric suddenness.
Once again occurred the formation of a new party. Out of the
pangs of moral, economic, partisan, racial, industrial, and religious differences emerged the new Republican Party. What was even more
amazing than the mixture of so many groups was its lack of an outstanding leader, a Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, or Clay. Lincoln
became its first successful candidate.
The Democratic Party meanwhile suffered from the untimely death
of Douglas, and the Civil War paralyzed it until the panic of 1873
changed the tide. The mere fact of its recovery at all after such an
experience was considered remarkable. Cleveland was successful in
1884, and led the party until Bryan assumed command. He was an
expert politician and watched the public pulse closely; but, as he lacked
the ability to transliterate its meanings into appropriate action, he missed
the presidency.
The Republicans, after their eventual rebirth, found winning candidates in Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, McKinley, Taft,
and Harding, and there followed the conservative regime. Theodore
Roosevelt stood pre-eminent as the master of group diplomacy, but the
ability of these other leaders was conspicuous by its absence of this art.
In this connection, Franklin Roosevelt is considered to have more of his
distant cousin in him than the mere fluid in his veins. Coolidge continued this era after the reactionary wave against Wilson swept the
Republicans back into power; the Party held sway until the catastrophe
of the Depression removed it again, and the practical politician, Roosevelt, assumed command. Its chances for returning seem to depend on
its ability to adopt a new strategy of attracting voters, according to the
author. He maintains that their only chance for revival--even survival-is to outbid the Democrats for the support of the middle and
lower income groups. He exhorts the "once proud and positive party
to cease being the child of fortuitous circumstance," to stop merely
"playing the breaks in one of the major crises of human history," and
to rally themselves to be ready to take control with more than "a
programless plea for a return to normalcy," in view of the fact that
"the party of Andrew Jackson has never drawn anything but grief at
the polls following a war."
There are some lessons from this history-both direct and implied
-which both parties might do well to consider. For example, though
trite enough, there must be those at present who flinch under the "noble"
phrase which proffers the idea that this is the "era of the common
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man." It is not a new term, nor is the irritation new. People writhed
under a similar conception when Van Buren attempted to don the Jacksonian mantle.
But the over-all teaching is that no organization can be secure.
Changing conditions dictate new regimes. When parties fail to maneuver themselves, because they have past commitments to keep, a new
combination takes over, because it can satisfy this kaleidoscopic tendency. Perhaps this factor is a fortunate one, nevertheless.
Then there is also the strikingly apparent fact that in a postwar
period the economic trend has always been a boom, followed by a panic
which lapsed into a depression. The regularity with whicl this cycle
has recurred might at present seem discouraging. Both parties would
do well, it seems, to concentrate on an adequately detailed system of
planning, in order to cushion, if not entirely prevent, such a recurrence.
However, equally encouraging is the consistency with which strong men
and radical policies have resulted at such times to meet the challenge.
So with the momentous times approaching, skeptics who despair of
efficient government from those in power at present, or such as the
opposition has so far offered, might find some comfort and solace in
the knowledge of this heretofore persistent rise of men of sufficient
caliber and ability to carry on the higher traditions of the parties' pasts.

Louis A. CHERRY.
Assistant Director, Institute of Government,
Chapel Hill, N. C.
Lawful Action of State Military Forces. By Edmund Ruffin Beckwith, James G. Holland, George W. Bacon, and Joseph W. McGovern. Foreword by General Hugh A. Drum. New York:
Random House. 1944. Pp. xviii, 248. $3.00 (cloth edition), or
$1.50 (paper edition without supplement).
Viewing current trends in our national existence, it seems to me
the authors of Lawful Action of State Military Forces have compiled
a book of rules of conduct which will become more and more an essential part of the equipment of state military services and of peace officers
and municipal authorities generally throughout the nation. The use of
state militias in preserving order and protecting property is not new to
us. Since the outbreak of World War II, however, federal troops
frequently have been called upon not only to preserve order and protect
property, but also to enforce continuance of industrial operations when
stoppages have occurred or become imminent by reason of labor unrest
or employer dissatisfaction. With the end of present hostilities and
the emergence of labor unionism from wartime conceptions of its pow-
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ers and rights, not forgetting its progressively increasing importance
prior to the war era, it appears almost inevitable that a protracted
evolutionary period will usher in frequent essays of miltiary bodies;
state and federal, to accomplish certain purposes or as preventative
measures in ominous contingencies.
Furthermore, this little volume is bound to become of no slight importance to members of the United States forces after this war, if not
before its dose. Upon even the shallowest reflection who can avoid a
little prophesying that with the precedents now being established almost
daily, not only in the forcible composure of labor and management
differences, but in other situations as well, conflicts between national
and state military machinery are bound to arise? Indeed, mutterings,
if not carefully veiled threats, have already emanated from more than
one of our states in their objections to certain federal proposals. Lawful Action of State Military Forces consequently is bound to become a
handy reference in such eventualities. While it treats primarily, and
exhaustively, concerning the rights, duties, privileges and restraints of
state military organizations, by this extraordinarily comprehensive detail it thereby indicates the lawful procedures and limitations of military action generally and must necessarily be helpful to federal officers
in the exercise of their authority. Moreover, it does establish the definite confines of state militia activities and in that respect will be of aid
in avoiding conflicts between state and federal operations and between
the military generally and various local municipal authorities and civilian peace officers.
Of unquestionable value to military officials are its discussions relating to the individual rights of officers and men. After all, every
person is accountable for his own acts, and a complete understanding
of his official and individual responsibility is always of the utmost importance, especially when dealing with situations involving his own
countrymen, not alien enemies.
One of the most conspiclious chapters of this work is that entitled
"Military Justice." Here the authors have compacted within less than
fifty pages a most succinct and interesting coverage of the fundamentals
of the administration of miltary law. While their professed design is
"to give only a general survey of its subjects because authoritative
manuals are readily available to anyone who may participate in a courtmartial or other phase of military justice," it would be difficult to find
a more practical and comprehensive discussion of the subject in so few
words. This chapter alone will prove most usable and valuable to any
commander of state or federal troops as a pocket primer and guide in
enforcing discipline, but avoiding the martinet's role, which is absolutely necessary in preserving the esprit de corps of any command.
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This subject was ably discussed recently before the American Bar
Association by the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army.
The chapters relating to "Restraint of Persons-Detentions,
Searches, Crimes," "Protection and Control of Civilians," and "Protection, Control and Military Use of Property" will prove of utmost
worth in many trying situations if quickly available to commanding
officers of troops engaged in domestic disturbances.
And not least complimentary to the authors is the obviousness, even
upon a cursory examination of this work, that it is extremely easy
reading and is set up in such form that desired information may quickly
be located within its 188 pages.
The authors and publisher are entitled to the highest commendation
for this novel but much needed treatise. It has been presented to us
as a public service, and it is distinctly that, based upon the ingrained
and revered American doctrine that "the civil authority should always
be supreme."
RoscoE S. CONKLING,
Member of the New York Bar,
Lt. Colonel, AUS.
Presidential Board of Appeals,
Selective Service System.
Married Woman's Bill of Rights. By Nathaniel Fishman.
York: Liveright Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 268.

New

When the law, following far behind most other human institutions,
finally progressed far enough to recognize that a married woman is
.a person as distinguished from a chattel or mere non-entity, a great
need for a certain kind of education arose. It became necessary, in
order to achieve the purposes for which those reform laws were intended, to inform the married women of the country that their spouses
were no longer legally their lords and masters. It is very likely that
few married women were often chastised with a rod which could be
passed through the wedding ring (a perfectly legal procedure at one
time) prior to or during the period of reform. Consequently, there
was probably no great necessity for informing them that when trouble
.arose at home they were legally free to defend themselves. Such defenses had in all likelihood been made long prior to the day when the
magnanimous law-makers took away the right of a man to beat his
wife. There is no doubt, however, that many women did not and
still do not realize just how independent from their husbands they were
-and are-in the eyes of the law.
This lack of knowledge springs perhaps from the fact that for a
long time law has been primarily a man's field. As a usual rule the
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married woman never came into active contact with the law, and in
the rare occasions on which she did so she usually relied on her male
relatives to handle the matter. Consequently, in a great majority of
cases she has never been apprised of the laws which exist in her favor,
nor has any effort been made to explain them to her. The net result
of such a situation is that she is no longer in a position to blissfully
disregard the law, but must reckon with it-in most cases at least-in
the same state of ignorance as do most laymen and many lawyers.
The dissemination of information concerning the rights of a married woman is a matter of considerable social importance. Very probably many unpleasant situations within the home could be alleviated
if the parties knew exactly what their legal rights and obligations were.
There is a generally recognized ignorance concerning the ways and
means and outcome of legal actions concerned with domestic disputes,
which usually results in fear and misuiderstanding concerning the legal
remedies available in domestic matters. Thus, many persons embroiled
in marital conflicts are afraid to avail themselves of the remedies which
are at hand; whereas, if they understood the nature of those remedies
more fully, their hesitation would quickly vanish. It has been argued
that such an ignorance has its merit-that if people had more specific
knowledge concerning the ways and means of ending a marriage, for
instance, there would be an increased tendency toward divorce. Perhaps! But one can make just as logical an argument that medical
knowledge should not be disseminated because people, knowing the
remedies available, will become careless of their health. Just as in
many cases some knowledge concerning medical remedies would result in a more intelligent effort to ease the suffering body, so would
iome knowledge of legal remedies serve to soothe troubled human relations. Thus, in disseminating such information one would be performing a public service.
In performing such a service, however, one would face an extremely
difficult task. The law, in the field of domestic relations, is not without ambiguity and complexities. One cannot set forth a few maxims
and content himself with the thought that the work is well done.
Neither can he be content with an attempt to hide his head in the sands
of a split of authority. In order to adequately perform he must set
forth in a clear understanding manner the general principles governing
each point of law covered, always carefully warning the reader that the
law of each jurisdiction will present variances and that in all controversies which have become serious enough to require legal action, a
lawyer should be consulted. The old adage that a little knowledge is
a dlangerous thing should be stressed.
Mr. Fishman, in his book, has striven to fill this need. He has at-
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tempted to set out the whole technical field of domestic relations in
,simple story book form. There are chapters on marriage, divorce and
alimony, on the adoption of children, and on the various phases of
property disposition and control. The dangers of such sub-legal relations as the common law marriage are pointed out, and the aggrieved
spouse is warned against attempts to solve his or her problems through
the medium of a Mexican mail-order divorce. Mr. Fishman touches
on the now famous case of Williams vs. State of North Carolina;' but,
either because he was afraid he would confuse his readers or because
he failed to grasp the full import of the court's decision, he does not
dearly state the qualifications surrounding the rule in this case, with
the result that the reader is left with a doubt as to just exactly what
the full significance of the case really is.
It is doubtful whether Mr. Fishman has succeeded in his attempt
to apprise married women of their legal rights. Indeed, -it is doubtful
whether anyone could do this in a simple generalized statement of the
law. Due to the multitude of variations in the law occurring in the
fifty-odd jurisdictions of this country, it is not very likely that anyone
could adequately accomplish in one simple story book what the author
purports to do in this book. One gets the impression on reading the
Married Wonan's Bill of Rights that the project was too ambitious.
Accordingly, the book is disappointing.
There are two other principal objections that should be pointed
out-objecti6ns which tend to make the work of mediocre quality.
First, too much attention has been paid to readability and too little
emphasis has been placed on the informative aspects of the book. For
instance, it appears that the cases commented upon were chosen for
their human interest rather than for their value as leading cases in their
field. Perhaps this is excusable in view of the fact that the book was
written primarily for laymen, but it adds nothing to its value as a
source of information. Second, too much emphasis has been placed
on the law of the State of New York. If this were a book written
primarily for New Yorkers, such an emphasis, of course, would be
desirable. However, the book purports to be of general interest. Therefore, the very heavy emphasis on the law of New York is, to say the
least, unnecessary.
The author is to be commended in his attempt to disseminate information concerning domestic relations and the rights of a married
woman. It. is regrettable, however, that the book does not more adequately fill the need which exists for informing married women as to
the legal rights which are available to them.
It would be difficult to recommend this book to either a lawyer or
S317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942).
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a layman who was engaged in more than an idle attempt to satisfy
his curiosity concerning the law in general.
FRED R. EDNEY.
Member of the North Carolina Bar
Associate Editor of the NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW, 1942-43
Reply to Review by R. W. Winston of Walter Clark, Fighting Judge

In the February issue' of

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

there appears a review by Judge Robert W. Winston of my biography
of WALTER CLARK, FIGHTING JUDGE. It was well known among their
intimates that Judge Winston and Judge Clark had a very poor opinion
of each other. Now that Clark's lips have been sealed in death for
more than twenty years, I, as his biographer, am interested in seeing
that justice is done to his memory.
The reading public has a right to assume that anyone reviewing a
book in a publication like yours is disinterested and certainly not unfriendly to the subject of the book. In this case the reverse is patently
true. Aside from Winston's personal dislike of Clark, much of his
previous writings show that he is an accomplished debunker of heroes.
His present discussion is not a review of the book, but an attempt to
answer it and to discredit Judge Clark. To serve his purpose he marshals a number of statements and insinuations reflecting upon his
character.
Perhaps the most flagrant instance in this review is the statement:
"Was it not unwise to declare that Clark never rode on a free pass,
whereas until February 28, 1891 every judge rode on a pass.... Judge
Clark who together with the other four judges of the Supreme Court
and indeed all the judges had such passes." In the light of Clark's
criticism of the use of free passes by public officials, as reflected in his
biography, if this statement of Judge Winston's is true, then Clark
was a hypocrite and a fraud. What is the truth of the matter? Judge
David Schenck was Division Counsel for the old Richmond and Danville Railroad prior to its absorption into the present Southern Railway
System. In a batch of Clark's letters marked "1885 to 1890" there is
a copy in his own handwriting of the following letter:
"Hon. David Schenck
My dear Judge,
I appreciate your courtesy in sending me a pass over the R & D
system. As I have refused all passes since occupying this position I
take the privilege of returning this. I know you will not think me
churlish or intending the slightest disrespect to one I esteem so highly
as yourself. Nor do I mean to intimate that any judicial officer is
'Winston, Book Review (1944) 22 N. C. L. REv. 181.
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guilty of impropriety in accepting these compliments which have the
sanction of years and of many of the best and finest judges. But I
simply defer to what in the greatest instrument of modern times is
given as a motive for public conduct, 'a decent regard for the opinions
of mankind' and to still higher authority which is equally familiar to
you, I Corinthians, 8th Chapter, 13th verse.
With thanks for your kind remembrance and with highest regard
always,
Sincerely yours,
Walter Clark."
A striking illustration of Winston's desire to belittle Clark is his
assertion: "Adding to his hero's fame it is said that he was honored
with an A.M. degree by our University in 1870. This is an error."
According to the Alumni History of the University of North Carolina,
Walter Clark received the following degrees from the University: A.B.
in 1864, A.M. in 1867, LL.D. in 1890. Res ipsa loquitur.
Still pursuing his purpose, he insinuates that Clark did not give up
a lucrative law practice in 1885 when he accepted the judgeship, but
that the $2500 salary was a "windfall." At the time of his appointment
to the bench, Clark was General Counsel for the Raleigh and Gaston, and
the Raleigh and Augusta Railroads, and also of the W. Duke Sons &
Company, perhaps the three richest corporations at that time in the

state. He had compiled and edited

CLARK'S CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

which at once became a standard work and enjoyed a wide sale. He
had the best private library in Raleigh and owned a controlling interest
in the Raleigh News. He appeared frequently before the Supreme
Court of the state, arguing his own and other lawyers' cases. Among
the latter were cases sent him by Honorable Pat Winston, the father
of the reviewer. It is the irony of fate that Judge Winston should have
disparagingly mentioned Clark's ownership of the Raleigh News, denominating it "a one-horse newspaper." Among Clark's papers are numerous letters from Pat Winston evincing friendship and admiration for
the younger man, and in more than one he asked Clark to allow him to
become a part owner in the paper. In one of these letters he offered
as an inducement to the partnership the fact that his two sons Robert
(our reviewer) and Frank were finishing school and they could be put
to setting type. If Robert had got printer's ink on his fingers he might
have been less severe in his criticisms of his father's friend.
A prime illustration offered by Winston in support of his criticisms
relates to the "Kilgo-Gattis Travesty Trials." The biography shows
that the trustees of Trinity College decided against Clark but that
Kilgo at the hearing exonerated Clark and fixed the blame on Gattis,
a superannuated Methodist preacher. Gattis brought suit in Granville
County for damages against Kilgo and Ben Duke for libel. Two juries
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found, under the direction of Judges Hoke and Shaw, that these defendants (Winston's clients) had maliciously libeled Gattis. One jury
awarded Gattis $15,000 damages and the other jury $20,000. The presiding judges declined to set either verdict aside. Clark was not a
party to this suit and did not sit on the case when it was three times
appealed to the Supreme Court. The case finally went off on a legal
technicality by an equally divided Supreme Court. Yet Winston, in
his abandon, makes this astonishing statement: "The trustees of Trinity College decided against Clark; the Supreme Court of four Republican judges did likewise and so did Judge Fred Moore and finally
Justices Connor and Brown."
The perfect key to Winston's antipathy to Clark is clearly revealed
in his own statement that Clark was "a forerunner of a political revolution which has since well nigh destroyed constitutional government."
This pregnant statement recognized that Clark was a forerunner and
that the American people have followed him. Of course, it is possible
that one hundred and thirty-three million free Americans may be wrong
and Judge Winston right. It may be that the world revolution which
is teed up on the teachings of Jefferson and Clark is all wrong and that
Winston is right.
He concludes his review: "Undoubtedly Aubrey Brooks has won
his case and made good his point." But he complains that Walter
Clark was a "fighting judge" and that he thought of a judge as a "detached, impartial personage, learned, just and merciful." Winston's
feigned resentment against Clark is not because he was a fighting judge
but because he fought on the wrong side, according to Winston. Clark
was fighting to destroy the American Tobacco trust, one of Winston's
clients, which Winston himself asserts "had for about fifteen years
crushed the life out of the tobacco farmers." Clark fought against
railroad monopolies and free passes. Winston did not like that, because he admits having twenty-five such passes in his own pocket while
holding court and trying a railroad case. Clark fought for a child
labor law, to free women and children from the slavery of the common
law, for an eight-hour-a-day law for laborers, to speed up the administration of justice and to stop needless delays and the use of worn-out
technicalities in the administration of justice. Of course, he was a
fighting judge who began a crusade, far ahead of his time and almost
alone, to socialize democracy and protect human rights as against the
glorification of property rights. Judges have always been fighters, but
unfortunately too many of them have fought on the wrong side. It is
an old story: Mr. Justice Miller, one of the ablest judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a personal letter to his brotherin-law which has recently come to light, speaking of his associates on
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that bench, who were also fighters, said: "It is vain to contend with
judges who have been at the bar the advocates for forty years of railroad companies, and all the forms of associated capital, when they are
called upon to decide cases where such interests are in contest. All
their training, all their feelings are from the start in favor of those
who need no such influence."
Justice Frankfurter, in his lecture on the "Life of Justice Holmes
and the Supreme Court" delivered a short while before he himself was
appointed to the Supreme Court, said: "As late as 1905 the Supreme
Court held it unconstitutional to limit the working hours of bakers to
ten, and as recently as 1936 the Court adhered to this ruling that it was
beyond the power of the state and of the nation to insure minimum
wage rates for women workers obviously incapable of economic selfprotection. Every variety of legislative manifestation to subject economic power to social responsibility encountered the judicial veto."
Robert H. Jackson, while Attorney General of the United States
and shortly before his appointment to the Supreme Court, in his book
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, wrote: "By 1933 the Court
was no longer regarded as one of the three equal departments among
which the powers of government were rlistributed ... it took over into
its control the whole range of national economy. It tried to stem the
increasing recession from laissez-faire and to make its teachings a part
of our constitutional law. It conjured up such doctrines as 'freedom
of contract' to defeat legislation, although the Court later found that
the Constitution did not mention it-and it did not put a curb on trusts
but on the people."
There is no such thing as a "detached" judge. The trouble in the
past has been that too many of them were "attached."
Adding insult to injury, Winston asserts that the "story" is told
that Murray Allen applied to Chief Justice White of the Supreme
Court of .the United States for writ of error to the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in a damage suit against the railroad; that
when the Chief Justice was told that Judge Clark had written the
opinion for the Court he signed the writ and certified the error "without reading the record." This story is unbelievable on its face, but if
it were true it Vonstitutes a greater reflection upon the Chief Justice
of the United States than it does upon the Chief Justice of North Carolina, and demonstrates that the great Chief Justice White was not
"detached" and was not "impartial." This "story" Winston has oft
repeated for the truth. I challenge him to produce a written statement
from Murray Allen that Chief Justice White ever made such a statement to him.
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Winston has told us what he thought of Clark. The situation
recalls the remark of a distinguished minister who was invited to hear
Ingersoll lecture on Moses. "No," he replied, "I would not give ten
cents to hear what he thinks of Moses, but I would give fifty dollars
to hear what Moses thinks of him."
AuBaEa L. BRooKs.
Greensboro, North Carolina.

